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Abstract
The paper argues that it is impossible to re-
solve the public debt problem within the existing 
economic policy model without changing the con-
ceptual relationship between monetary and fiscal 
policy, i.e. without reconfirming the relationship 
between the policies and without strengthening 
the fiscal policy role. Otherwise, it is believed, 
the current model leads to a recession, while pu-
blic debt problem remains unresolved. The exi-
sting model does not question the creation and 
structure of private debt and its effects on public 
debt, but the attention is given only to irresponsi-
ble fiscal policy. Understanding the public debt 
determinants is a prerequisite for effective public 
debt management and for private agents’ positi-
ve expectations. In the paper, several manageri-
al implications of the research results are, also, 
identified and presented.
Keywords: public debt management, EU mo-
netary and fiscal policy, determinants of public 
debt
1. INTRODUCTION - PUBLIC
DEBT AS A STRUCTURAL 
MONETARY AND FISCAL
PHENOMENON
The sovereign debt crisis has birthed a
great theoretical debate regarding both its 
causes and consequences but also regarding 
the need for more fiscal limits and greater fis-
cal consolidation efforts based on EU/EMU 
mainstream model of economic policy. 
Although the current debt problem is the 
problem of debt explosion in general, both 
public and private, stigmatization of public 
debt stems from the structural understanding 
of fiscal policy’s role within the neoclassi-
cal mainstream model of “competitive defla-
tion” among the EMU, as well as among the 
non-EMU countries. According to the given 
model, fiscal policy has to be neutral, while 
the common monetary policy ensures price 
stability and growth based on the idea of 
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free movement of capital and financial inte-
gration which was intended to be achieved 
through “forced convergence” of the coun-
tries’ economies. 
This paper argues that it is impossible to 
resolve the public debt problem within the 
existing model without changing the con-
ceptual relationship between monetary and 
fiscal policy, without reconfirming the rela-
tionship between the policies and without 
strengthening the fiscal policy role in the 
same time. Otherwise, it is believed, the cur-
rent economic policy model leads to a reces-
sion, while the public debt problem remains 
unresolved. 
The existing model does not question the 
creation and structure of private debt and its 
effects on public debt, but the attention is giv-
en to irresponsible fiscal policy. The private 
debt problem is, therefore, neglected due to 
conceptual limitations of the existing archi-
tecture. The alternative logic sees structure, 
sources and volatility of private debt as sig-
nificant for economic growth and, thus, for 
the stability of public debt itself, expressed 
in relative terms to GDP. The current crisis 
and the emergence of debt are both results 
of volatility of capital inflows and inability 
of the existing monetary and fiscal set-up to 
provide adequate response to volatility in 
private debt levels, particularly private sec-
tor loans, in highly financialized economies.
The starting point of this research is 
the view that public debt is not only a fis-
cal problem but a monetary-financial phe-
nomenon. Public debt drivers are, to a large 
extent, out of fiscal policy scope. Therefore, 
the problem of public debt is a structural fi-
nancial problem.
Contrary to this approach, the European 
sovereign debt crisis is widely believed to 
have its origins in fundamental macroeco-
nomic imbalances, therefore austerity policy 
is largely seen as necessary with the aim of 
regaining the financial markets’ trust. Given 
that, the public debt crisis is understood as 
competitiveness crisis, expressed in high ex-
ternal debt, or current account deficit. We, 
however, believe this is a wrong diagnosis. 
It is increasingly being confirmed that in 
the situation where government and private 
sector are deleveraging, and where the cur-
rent account deficit is being reduced, as is 
the case for the selected EU New Member 
States (NMS) which we analyse, the balance 
is being established at the lower employment 
capacity level.
This paper aims at addressing questions 
like: “In what particular degree are the mac-
roeconomic imbalances the cause of the 
sovereign debt crisis?”, “Is the public debt 
issue purely a reflection of inadequate poli-
cies (such as the excessive governmental 
expenditure) or is it caused by the overall in-
stitutional failure within the Union’s design? 
The authors accept heterodox, mainly 
the Post-Keynesian thesis focusing on the 
need to focus more on the volatility of capi-
tal flows. Moreover, the authors support the 
view that the austerity measures impact im-
ports more than exports.
The paper explores macroeconomic de-
terminants of public debt in post-transitional 
NMS. As such, the research aims at contrib-
uting to better understanding, thereby more 
efficient managing, of public debt though 
application of adequate economic policy. It 
is believed this can be achieved only by un-
derstanding its causes as well as its conse-
quences, the latter meaning the influence it 
has on economic growth as well as on other 
macroeconomic variables.
In the years following 2008 global eco-
nomic crisis, post-transition EU countries 
have, almost universally, applied economic 
policy of active public debt management, 
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which, without exception, primarily focused 
on stabilizing it, and by doing that, auto-
matically accepting the doctrinal theoretical 
and vague empirical framework of public 
debt impact on the economy. Regardless of 
varying attitudes towards the issues of pub-
lic debt, in the post-crisis environment it 
became a number one policy issue and one 
of fundamental determinants of official IMF 
and EU policies, as well as of national mac-
ro-policies expressed through austerity and 
fiscal consolidation policies.
Such deficit-focused policies can have 
more or less pronounced implications on 
management’s investment decisions as well 
as on households saving and spending pro-
pensity. Effects of such policies on corpo-
rations and households depend on how fis-
cal adjustments are achieved – through tax 
increase, public investment cuts, current 
spending cuts or though combination.
Nevertheless, such government debt pol-
icies can have contractionary or expansion-
ary effect which largely depends on certain 
policy’s ability to crowed in or crowd out 
private sector investments. A fundamental 
reason why, to some extent, certain policies 
will impact the private sector lies in its abil-
ity to encourage consumption and investing, 
though alleviating expectations and sparking 
optimism.
This research was motivated by the as-
sumption that post-crisis attitude towards 
public debt might not only be justified as 
public debt growth nor by the fact that it has 
to be a result of expansive fiscal policies, 
institutionalized social mechanisms or irre-
sponsible governments but, rather, a result of 
the applied economic growth model and in-
sufficient monetary and fiscal coordination. 
By researching the public debt macro-
economic determinants, this paper attempts 
to confirm the hypothesis that for reducing 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio the most impor-
tant thing is to positively influence the GDP 
growth factor, the denominator, rather than 
directly target reduction of public debt lev-
els through fiscal adjustments, the numera-
tor. This view promotes the idea that public 
debt is a macroeconomic cause rather than 
a consequence, emphasizing its endogenous 
character.
Without the intention of minimizing the 
negative consequences public debt can have 
on economy, this paper argues that pub-
lic debt in post-transition NMS countries 
was not the main cause of post-crisis ane-
mic growth, but that the main cause can be 
found in unprecedented economic growth 
rates which were impossible to achieve and 
which, in turn, increased debt levels. This 
impossibility, it is believed, stems from 
structural weaknesses of the economies 
themselves (structure of the economy, struc-
ture of government spending, etc.) but also 
from inadequate institutional architecture 
and EU-imposed regulation, which in its rec-
ommendations on public debt management 
did not take into account the structural weak-
nesses and specificities of the NMS countries
The paper follows the standard research 
paper structure. In the introductory chapter 
we start with the hypothesis that public debt 
crisis is not the cause but rather the outcome 
of institutional and financial failures. It is 
believed the results would contribute to re-
shaping the reform paths in these countries. 
In the second chapter, relevant literature is 
reviewed through theoretical debate frame-
work, establishing relevance of the debate 
for the EU post-transition New Member 
States. Interaction of the theoretically rele-
vant variables and their assumed influence is 
provided in the third chapter. Public debt de-
terminants are tested and the empirical anal-
ysis is carried out in the fourth chapter, while 
the findings are provided in the last one.
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2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW:
DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC
DEBT
For the past few years, within the theo-
retical discourse, the issue concerning the 
public debt crisis has intensified. The main-
stream, neoclassical economic theory argues 
the damaging impacts of permanent budget 
deficits and high public debt on national sav-
ing, investment and net export.  
On the other side, the heterodox ap-
proaches, mainly Post-Keynesian theoreti-
cians, perceive the public debt in accordance 
with the Keynesian and Minskyian prin-
ciples, understanding it as an institutional 
monetary and financial phenomenon, point-
ing out the institutional weakness of both the 
EU and the EMU, with regard to the inherent 
financial instability of the overall construct 
of the “money manager capitalism”.
In case the public debt problem is caused 
by lack of fiscal responsibility within the 
formal policy framework, the problem can 
be addressed by further implementing the 
supply-side reforms, structural changes and 
austerity measures within an export-led 
strategy (German money mercantilism), and, 
basically, as a forced convergence. 
Because of the joint conservative mon-
etary policy and limited fiscal policy, the 
countries are basically left only with market 
reforms. The fundamental point for this con-
cept is the conviction that the stateless cur-
rency1, trough financial integration, coupled 
with the free flow of capital, in turn, yields 
greater competitiveness and growth, and 
thus – an increase in convergence. Financial 
integration as a driver of growth and conver-
gence seems as a naive notion.
1  The fundamental critique of EMU had been provided by Pargues (1999) at its very beginning. 
2  The Euro, as a stateless private currency, is the means of exchange, but not a policy instrument.
In his extensive critique, De Grauwe 
(2013) points out that the problem is struc-
tural in nature. The fundamental purport of 
our approach is that public debt crisis is basi-
cally a monetary and financial epiphenom-
enon. The public debt issue is the outcome 
of structural disturbances produced by the 
institutionally weak EMU/EU, as well as by 
the existing discrepancy between monetary 
and fiscal policy (so called rupture).2 
All the while, the decentralised fiscal 
policy is burdened and limited by regulations, 
making it essentially a deflationary policy, 
one having the sole goal of preserving the cur-
rency value. In contrast to the monetary non-
sovereign countries, public debt in principle 
does not present a problem for the monetary 
sovereign ones’, as long as it can be financed 
through deficit, without sparking the inflation. 
Because of the scope of crisis that has 
gripped the periphery of EMU, a large por-
tion of literature has been dedicated to these 
countries. On the other hand, most NMS 
kept their currencies, making it interesting to 
explore how much austerity policy has con-
tributed to increasing competitiveness and 
stabilizing and reducing the public debt.
However, a question remains: is the pub-
lic debt crisis of the national monetary sys-
tems a balance of payments problem (less 
competitiveness), or a monetary, financial 
and structural issue?! The Post-Keynesian 
approach presupposes the latter, where both, 
growth and convergence of these countries, 
is under the influence of the capital influx, 
with the financial market volatility (subject 
to boom and bust cycles) causing both the 
volatility of private debt and GDP, as well 
as the necessary public debt increase. The 
public debt fluctuations, according to this 
particular approach, is a necessary regulator 
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of national stability, with the fluctuations of 
public debt boiling down to the financial sec-
tor regulation, as well as the institutional fis-
cal policy reform, with no regard for alterna-
tives chosen - a banking union, fiscal union 
or by abandoning a “one-size-fits-all” policy.
In this particular section a research over-
view with regard to the relation between 
the chosen variables, proposed by previous 
researches, and the public debt, with em-
phasis on NMS is provided. With the onset 
and passing of the economic crisis, the fiscal 
policy impact on the economic growth has 
regained its significance in the scientific and 
research community. The fiscal policy, along 
with the other economic policies, has a key 
impact on both the short and long-term eco-
nomic activity. 
With the onset of the 2008 global eco-
nomic crisis, numerous countries have, at 
first with the activation of automatic stabilis-
ers (such as the social expenditures, the un-
employment benefits, etc.) tried to alleviate 
the detrimental crisis’ effects, and later with 
financial stimulation (increase in the govern-
ment expenditure, tax policy reforms, etc.), 
thus aiming at encouraging the aggregate 
demand and consequently, the GDP growth 
of national economies. Considering the de-
crease of tax revenues, as a result of the di-
minished private sector economic activity, 
such increase in public spending has neces-
sarily led to the budgetary turn, served to 
once again encourage the discussions on the 
relationship between public debt and eco-
nomic growth, more precisely, what is the 
3  In particular, Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) have tested and confirmed a thesis regarding the non-linear correlation 
between the size of public debt and economic growth, concluding that there is a certain threshold of public debt to 
GDP, after which any further public debt increase negatively affects economic growth. 
4 Swamy (2015), based on a sample of multiple countries, concludes that the GDP growth rate, the FDI influx, the 
government expenditures, as well as inflation, have negative effects on the public debt, with the investments in fixed 
capital and the countries’ trade openness impacting the public debt favourably.
nature of that relationship (linear or non-lin-
ear) (Cecchetti, et al., 2011), and what is, if 
any, the causal link between them (Panizza 
and Presbitero, 2013).  
The research that followed, including 
works of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)3, 
Cecchetti et al. (2011), Minea and Parent 
(2012), Checherita-Westphal et al. (2012) 
as well as many others, confirm the non-
linear and complex relationship, while in 
the same time highly questionable, and ul-
timately even reverse causality between the 
two variables (Irons and Bivnes, 2010; 
Herndon et al., 2013; Dube, 2013).
Channels of influence of public debt 
on growth are numerous. For example, 
Cecchetti, et al. (2011) hold that the high 
indebtedness may significantly increase the 
risk premium influencing the future financ-
ing activities. Kumar and Woo (2010) con-
cluded that the negative influence of high 
government indebtedness can be linked to 
the decline in work productivity due to the 
decline of investment activities, i.e. the ac-
cumulation of fixed capital. With regard to 
the research dealing with Eurozone member 
states and the NMS, most of the research 
conducted analyse the (non)linearity rela-
tionship between the public debt and eco-
nomic growth, as well as their impact on the 
GDP growth rate, with a smaller research 
portion focusing on the macroeconomic 
determinants of public debt, concentrating 
largely on EU member states (Mota et al., 
2012; Globan and Matošec, 2016).4
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In contrast to the papers examining the 
public debt impact on the GDP, we tend to 
agree with the theoretical outlook of Dube 
(2013)  as well as many other authors, who 
hold that the GDP fluctuations from previous 
periods influences the present public debt, a 
causality which, in Granger’s viewpoint, has 
been proved. 5
Based on the works of Gros (2015) and 
others, the variables of both external debt 
and current account, the latter serving as 
an approximation of capital influx, have 
been included in the model, while the Post-
Keynesian theory and Keen (2013) hold that 
the public debt is not the source of the 
problem, but that the private debt, the loans, 
resulted in the inclusion of private debt. This 
means that, in principle, the public debt de-
fault is not the cause of crisis but the default 
of private debt. Moreover, with the onset of 
the crisis, the cause of GDP decrease is a 
sudden drop in capital influx, thus inducing 
public debt growth. It is supposed that ex-
ternal debt positively influences public debt, 
taking into account large capital inflows be-
fore the crisis.
At the very beginning, the relation be-
tween variables are presented in the scatter 
diagrams (see Appendix) with predicted val-
ues. The scatter diagrams contain estimated 
regression impact line for each of the mac-
roeconomic variables that proved to have 
statistical significance on the public debt to 
GDP variable.
5 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1995 - 2015
Lags: 2 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 DEBT does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH  201  0.70394 0.4959
 GDP_GROWTH does not Granger Cause DEBT  4.01285 0.0196
6 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. All countries are members of EU
The analysis was conducted on a sample 
of 11 EU NMS post-transition countries6 in 
the period from 1995 –2015.
In line with the assumed impact of GDP 
growth on declining public debt to GDP 
ratio, the scatter diagram indicates that the 
decrease of public debt to GDP ratio is only 
possible through increase in investment ac-
tivity. The primary budget deficit did not 
have significant influence on public debt in 
NMS countries. The external debt positively 
influenced public debt taking into account 
large capital inflows before the crisis. The 
scatter diagrams show that, within the NMS, 
a greater development and convergence of 
national monetary systems, based on capital 
influx, ultimately causes macroeconomic im-
balances. In such a manner, the current ac-
count deficit impacts the public debt, while, 
in the same time, positively influencing GDP. 
The cause for GDP decrease with the onset 
of the crisis is the sudden drop in capital in-
flux, thus inducing public debt growth. The 
decrease in “private insurance channel” has 
been replaced by the “public insurance chan-
nel”, signifying the overall increase in public 
debt.  The fear of inflation and the collapse 
of the common currency trough market seg-
mentation and weakened financial integra-
tion has resulted in financial consolidation 
and austerity measures which have proved to 
be recessionary.
This practically means that the import 
(consumption-led) growth strategy, while 
transitioning to an export-led strategy in 
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post-crisis times in these countries with de-
clining current account deficit (due to auster-
ity measures), is achieved at a lower income 
levels, as was shown by Staehr (2015). The 
long-term reduction of public debt is possi-
ble by accelerating growth, and accordingly, 
lower post-crisis growth is an obstacle to sig-
nificantly reducing public debt as the ratio.
3. VARIABLES AND THE
EXPECTED EFFECTS
Taking into account the findings of pre-
viously conducted research, the following 
section aims at identifying the main macro-
economic variables that have been identified 
as statistically significantly influencing the 
dependent variable of public debt to GDP, 
as well as at laying out their expected influ-
ence on the dependent variable. The research 
is carried out on a sample of 11 post-transi-
tional countries, all of them being EU mem-
ber states, and almost half being Eurozone 
members7. The period researched includes 
data from 1995 – 2015. The data on variables 
used in the research include different sourc-
es, namely WDI database of World Bank for 
investments in fixed capital, trade openness 
and final consumption; WIIW database for 
total general government debt, price index-
es, current account balance, real GDP growth 
rate as well as the FDI inflow (in % of GDP), 
Eurostat database for the 10-year govern-
ment bonds yields; and finally ECB database 
for the primary budget balance. Data for con-
solidated private sector debt (in % of GDP) 
were obtained from Eurostat.
The identified macroeconomic variables 
used as public debt to GDP determinants, 
for the purpose of this research are as fol-
lows: trade openness, expressed as the ratio 
between the sum total of imports and exports 
7 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia
to GDP, the inflation rate, expressed as the 
yearly change of the harmonized price index 
(2005 = 100), the real GDP growth rate (in 
percentage points), the primary government 
budget balance (as percentage of GDP), as 
well as the investment in fixed capital, as 
the proxy variable for total investments in 
economy (yearly growth rate), the current 
account balance (as percentage of GDP), to-
tal government expenditures (as percentage 
of GDP), total consumption (as percentage 
of GDP), expressed as the sum of govern-
ment and household final consumption). The 
last variable represents the measure of ag-
gregate absorption for the entire economy. 
Along with the already mentioned variables, 
the 10-year government bonds yield and the 
total FDI inflow (in % of GDP) to sampled 
countries are also used.
Prior to presenting the results of the 
econometric analysis, the expected influence 
of the mentioned variables on the dependent 
variable is explained.  
The trade openness is expected to lower 
the public debt to GDP ratio of a particular 
country (Berg & Krueger, 2003). 
The inflation rate, a variable that is as-
sumed to reflect the macroeconomic stabil-
ity, has a negative expected impact on public 
debt, assuming that a country with low infla-
tion has the option of borrowing under more 
favourable conditions, while at the same 
time, the burden of repaying the mentioned 
debt, under high inflation conditions, is ef-
fectively lower. 
The primary budgetary balance has an 
expected negative impact on public debt 
increase, meaning that the improvement in 
budget balance (deficit decrease) should re-
sult in public debt decrease, and vice versa 
(Globan and Matošec, 2016). 
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The investment variable, expressed as 
the investment in fixed capital, should yield 
negative influence on the dependent vari-
able, under the assumption that it increases 
the employment rate and GDP. 
The total government expenditure vari-
able is assumed to have a positive impact 
on the public debt, meaning its increase, 
with particular respect to its structure, (ex-
penditure in productive endeavours, such as 
R&D), should ultimately lead to the decrease 
of public debt, with vice versa also being 
true.  
With regard to the impact of the long-
term government bond yield, the research 
suggests the existing positive correlation 
with public debt (Globan and Matošec, 
2016), which can be explained with the 
creditors’ insistence on the higher interest 
rates, with the increase of public debt and, 
correspond-ingly, the risk premium. 
The FDI is supposed to negatively im-
pact the public debt, in a way that it, as a 
form of “imported” savings, influences the 
increase of productivity and “know-how”, 
thus decreasing the need for public borrow-
ing (Mota et al., 2012).
According to Keen, causality between 
public debt and economic growth can only 
be explained by understanding the process 
of creation and change in private debt. Keen 
provides theoretical framework, concluding 
that private debt change influences employ-
ment, whereby the crisis begins when pri-
vate debt to GDP starts declining, i.e. when 
private sector starts deleveraging and public 
debt starts growing as a response to rising 
unemployment. He also recognizes theoreti-
cal limitations of the existing models, there-
by rejecting the neutrality of debt, primar-
ily because of its endogenous creation, thus 
rejecting the thesis of bank neutrality, and 
banking and financial systems in general, as 
debt creating systems. Keen acknowledges 
that the bank loans raise total purchasing 
power in the economy because banks make 
profit, thus affecting aggregate demand. By 
this he is referring to endogenous money 
theory. With this contribution, Keen also re-
jects neoclassical and Neo-Keynesian theo-
retical models, considering them as defective 
(Keen, 2014).
On the other hand, the importance of 
private sector is also emphasized by Michel 
Roberts who goes further, considering that 
divergence between credit growth and GDP 
growth is not a good indicator as public 
debt partially takes over the growth func-
tion (Roberts, 2012). For this reason, he 
sees Marx’s law of profitability as a better 
indicator that gauges the divergence between 
declining profits and credit growth, thereby 
replacing GDP with profitability. In this re-
gard, Roberts considers the best profitability 
indicator to be the net worth, which, accord-
ing to him, is to be compared against capital 
(fixed assets but also aggregate assets which 
include financial (fictitious) capital as well). 
Roberts establishes that public debt growth 
coincides with private sector investment in 
fictitious capital (financial assets) as a result 
of private sector profitability (net worth) de-
cline. Decline in profitability levels cause a 
fall in investment level and contraction of 
the economy, which again causes a rise in 
private debt. If the private sector needs to be 
“rescued” by the government, there is also a 
rise in public debt. The public sector is not 
directly involved in the causality process, as 
he sees it.
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY,
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
RESULTS AND MANAGERIAL 
IMPLICATIONS
The econometric analysis carried out 
utilises the panel analysis models, with the 
random effects model and with the includ-
ed robust estimate errors, with intention of 
eliminating the heteroscedasticity issue. 
Also, with the aim of controlling the residual 
autocorrelation, a lagged dependent variable 
of general government debt, expressed as the 
part of GDP has as well been included as yet 
another explanatory variable.
Random effects model is a simple linear 
model, which supposes that the main criteria 
for unit inclusion corresponds to random-
ness principles. Also, it presumes that the 
differences between subjects are based on 
randomness. A random effects model has the 
following formulation: 
1 1 2 2 ... ; 1,... , 1,...,it it it k itK i ity x x x i N t Tµ β β β α ε= + + + + + + = =
1 1 2 2 ... ;  1,... , 1,...,it it it k itK i ity x x x i N t Tµ β β β α ε= + + + + + + = =
With µ  as the common, constant for all the 
sampled units, iα signifying the random 
effect for each sampled unit. The premise 
of the model is that iα are independent 
and identically distributed random variables 
across all of the sampled units, with the mean 
value of zero and the variance of 2ασ , while 
1,..., Kβ β , are the parameters that need to 
be assessed. Also, the assumption is that itε
are independent and identically distributed 
random variables across all of the sampled 
units, with the mean of 0 and the variance 
of 2εσ .
The validity of using a random effects model 
is carried using the Lagrange multiplier test 
(LM). If 0iα =  holds true for each sampled 
unit i, there is no need to use a random 
effects model.  The assumption of the model 
is that ( ) 0iE α =  and if this particular 
condition, as well as 2 0ασ =  holds true, the 
randomness effect may be excluded from the 
model.
If the LM value of the Breusch-Pagan test 
is less than 2 (1)αχ , for the given significance 
level of α , the null-hypothesis, the one which 
assumes that the random effect variance 
of observable units is equal to zero, isn’t 
rejected. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the heterogeneity between the observed units 
is non-existent, so the use of random effects 
model is unnecessary. 
If the LM value of the Breusch-Pagan test is 
greater than
2 (1)αχ  for the given significance
level of α  the null-hypothesis is rejected, the 
one assuming the random effect variance 
equals zero. Therefore, it is concluded that, 
in case the random effect variance is greater 
than zero, heterogeneity between observed 
units exists, so the random effects model is 
suitable for parameter assessment.
The econometric analysis tests the following
equation (the carried LM test rejects the 
null-hypothesis for all the panel models, 
accepting the random effects model as the 
appropriate one for assessing the following 
parameters):
With the µ  signifying the common, constant 
for all the sampled units, iα  is the random 
effect for each sampled units,  is the general 
government debt expressed as the percentage 
point of GDP, in the time period t;  is the real 
GDP growth rate, with the  vector of other 
explanatory variables. The following table 
showcases the econometric analysis findings. 
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Table 1: The random effect static panel (robust error estimates) with Government Debt to GDP ratio 
as dependent variable
Dependent variable → Govdebt_gdp Govdebt_gdp Govdebt_gdp
Constant -17.5407 (5.684835)*** -21.11394 
(5.844929)***
-14.0788 
(8.17655)*
Govdebt_gdp_lag1 0.8768619 
(0.0419447)***
0.8404479 
(0.0455327)***
0.8774057 
(0.0456862)***
Gdp_growth -0.3901935 
(0.1309248)***
/ -0.4527837 
(0.1177069)***
Investments_annual -0.0549111 
(0.0168416)***
/ /
Cabalance_gdp / 0.2993412 
(0.101017)***
0.1439048 
(0.0734588)**
Gov_expenditures 0.4842303 
(0.0114611)***
0.6247266 
(0.1141514)***
0.4249408 
(0.1172454)***
Tradeop_index 0.0364532 
(0.0138813)***
0.0245478 
(0.0160169)
/
Final_consumption / / 0.0452096 
(0.069381)
Price_index / / /
Primary_balance / / /
Bond_yield / / /
Fdi_inflowgdp / / /
Privatedebt_gdp / / /
Number of 
observations
212 212 212
Number of countries 11 11 11
*,**,*** statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% 
i 1%, respectively. 
Standard error values are 
in brackets
The panel analysis models were used 
for testing the influence of the selected 
independent variables on the government 
debt to GDP dependent variable. In 
accordance with the results expected, the 
increase in real GDP growth rates negatively 
influences the shifts in the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, two distinct models 
showed a positive, statistically significant 
influence of the current account balance on 
the public debt. 
The government expenditure variable 
positively influenced the public debt, as 
expected. The variable of investment in fixed 
capital, using two distinct models turned 
out to be statistically significant, but with 
negative impact on public debt, which was 
anticipated. 
The variable of total final consumption 
and price index did not show statistical 
significance. In accordance with the 
presumption, the government long-term 
bonds yields proved to be statistically 
significant, coupled with a relatively large 
economic impact, while variable of FDI 
inflow also turned out to be statistically 
significant, but with a negative impact on 
public debt, which was also anticipated.
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Govdebt_gdp Govdebt_gdp Govdebt_gdp Govdebt_gdp
-6.040672 
(2.309261)***
-9.590017 
(4.032364)***
-10.5919 
(6.682224)
-0.3872614 
(1.619928)
0.9751775 
(0.0279919)***
0.8893647 
(0.0385706)***
0.92964 
(0.0371273)***
0.9844326 
(.0199417)***
/ -0.3420726 
(0.1192057)***
/ -0.3395186 
(.1316557)***
/ -0.0583603 
(0.0153983)***
-0.104852 
(0.0342297)***
-0.005581 
(.0170814)
0.2295228 
(0.0791476)***
/ /
/ 0.4003881 
(0.100521)***
0.2672779 
(0.15273)*
/ /
/ /
0.049676 
(0.0142916)***
/ 0.0246317 
(0.0179161)
-1.069582 
(0.1414569)***
/ -0.6395677 
(0.2016089)***
-0.861435 
(.1581717)***
0.3570784 
(0.128094)***
/
/ -0.2283894 
(0.0658627)***
/
/ / / 0.0259963 
(.0102099)***
139 212 212 188
10 11 11 11
The results from our panel analysis of 
public debt determinants could be useful for 
public debt management. Namely, it creates 
an environment that can impact private 
sector decisions. This macroeconomic 
environment contributes to different private 
sector behaviour, differently influencing 
households and companies.
As a result of that, successful public debt 
management will positively influence GDP, 
lowering long-term public debt to GDP 
ratio bringing it to sustainable levels. The 
fiscal consolidation achieved through public 
spending cuts, which largely characterized 
public debt policy of the NMS countries, 
has mainly produced contractionary effect 
in the short term, negatively influencing 
the private sector behaviour which largely 
restrained from increasing consumption and 
from increasing investments resulting in 
stagnant GDP. Deflationary character of such 
policies tended to postpone investments and 
consumption in the short run because of the 
falling prices and stagnant wages, limiting 
private sector indebting despite the extremely 
low interest rates environment. As such 
fiscal consolidation limited private sector 
expectations, directly influencing the private 
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sector debt levels, corporation’s investments, 
household spending, and finally, aggregate 
demand and GDP. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
Growth of NMS, which are in the focus of 
our interest, is realized through imbalances, 
particularly through the current account 
deficit and the growth of external debt which 
are both sustainable to the extent of the 
constant inflow of capital. The instability of 
“private insurance channel” through sudden 
stops caused by financial sector frictions 
and excessive private indebtedness leads to 
GDP contraction and public debt growth. 
Thus, the sudden growth of public debt 
in these countries is primarily a reflection 
of monetary and financial developments. 
Within the existing model characterized by 
the absence of institutional arrangements 
like fiscal transfers, fiscal union, complete 
bank union etc., the fear of pubic debt’s 
negative impact on inflation and interest 
rates, regardless of its size, leads to the 
necessity of fiscal consolidation and austerity 
measures that deepen the recession. With 
the lack of ability to monetize public debt, 
given the separation between monetary and 
fiscal policies (public debt as in the sense of 
“handbag economics”) and with a desire to 
preserve low and stable prices as the goal 
of monetary policy, fiscal consolidation 
and forced convergence are implemented. 
The fall in the imbalance of payments, and 
a decrease in the current account deficit and 
external debt, result in lower growth, weaker 
impact of public debt cuts, as well as in the 
slowdown of the convergence process itself.
If we accept the conceptual Post-Keynesian 
stance that public debt is a structural monetary 
and financial problem, not just the fiscal one, 
we can say that public debt management and 
public debt problem solving lies within the 
necessary institutional changes in the EMU 
/ EU. In other words, in the ability to re-
conceptualize the monetary and fiscal sphere 
and in strengthening domestic savings as 
opposed to volatile capital inflows.
The above results confirm the hypothesis 
that influencing GDP growth rate is the most 
important factor for stabilizing and reducing 
the public debt in the NMS countries. Active 
and direct public debt management through 
fiscal consolidation and savings policies 
can, particularly in the short term, adversely 
affect GDP and, thus, increase public debt, 
causing quite the opposite effect from the 
one desired.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: Relationship between Government Debt to GDP ratio and GDP growth rate
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Figure 2: Relationship between Government Debt to GDP ratio and General Government 
Expenditures to GDP ratio
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
go
v_
de
bt
 (i
n 
%
 o
f G
D
P)
30 40 50 60
General government expenditures, total (in % of GDP)
debt Fitted values
95
Management, Vol. 23, 2018, No.1, pp. 81-97
M. Pečarić, V. Slišković, T. Kusanović: PUBLIC DEBT IN NEW EU MEMBER STATES –  PANEL...
Figure 3: Relationship between Government Debt to GDP ratio and Investments Growth rate
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Figure 4: Relationship between Government Debt to GDP ratio and Primary 
Budget Balance to GDP ratio
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
go
v_
de
bt
 (i
n 
%
 o
f G
D
P)
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10
primary_balance (in % of GDP)
debt Fitted values
Journal of Contemporary Management Issues
96
Figure 5: Relationship between Government Debt to GDP ratio and Real Average Interest Rate Paid 
on Governemnt Bonds
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Figure 6: Relationship between Government Debt to GDP ratio and Current Account Balance to 
GDP ratio
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Figure 7: Relationship between Government Debt to GDP ratio and FDI inflow
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